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ABSTRACT
In the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis, and the criticism 
directed towards the International Monetary Fund, in particular, for not 
having seen it coming, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) was created 
in 1999 under a mandate from the G7 ministers of finance and central
bank governors.  The Asian Financial Crisis arose suddenly, spread 
rapidly, and spared neither developed nor developing economies in the
region, although some fared much better than others.  In retrospect, the 
causes of the crisis were obvious and the consequences predictable. 
“Contagion” entered the financial lexicon.
Thus, the role of the FSF was to promote financial stability across 
national borders and provide an early warning system, identifying 
potential weaknesses or “vulnerabilities” in national financial systems,
with a view to preventing a repetition of the localized financial chaos of 
1997. The development of international standards for financial and 
other commercial regulation and the implementation of the Financial
Sector Assessment Program or “FSAP”—designed to monitor and 
assess financial stability on a country by country basis—were two of the
initiatives associated with the FSF.
* Visiting Professor, Duke Law School; Associate Professor, Melbourne Law School; 
European Corporate Governance Institute.
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The Asian Financial Crisis, however, was just a tremor compared to 
the earthquake of the current Global Financial Crisis (GFC) which has 
shaken financial markets around the world less than a decade after the 
establishment of the FSF.
That the FSF was a failure is patently obvious.  It has been relegated 
to the dustbin of history with little ado.  This paper will endeavour to 
identify some of the reasons for the failure of the FSF, with a particular 
focus on international standard setting and financial sector assessment
initiatives, with a view to assessing the prospects of  the reincarnation of 
the FSF, the new Financial Stability Board (FSB).
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“The financial system was a victim of its own rationality.”
 Gunther Teubner, October 31, 2008.1 
I. INTRODUCTION
It was a good idea at the time; a forum to bring together, in a fairly 
neutral and low-key manner, financial sector representatives, who for 
reasons of institutional isolation2 or otherwise, would not necessarily sit 
down together on a regular basis.  So in 1999, in the aftermath of the 
Asian Financial Crisis, and the criticism directed towards the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) in particular for not having seen it coming, the 
Financial Stability Forum (FSF) was created under a mandate from the 
G7 ministers of finance and central bank governors.3  After an initial
honeymoon period, however, the FSF appeared to lose its way, ultimately 
proving to be a monumental disappointment. 
The Asian Financial Crisis arose suddenly, spread rapidly, and spared
neither developed nor developing economies in the region; although 
some fared much better than others.4  In retrospect, the causes of the 
crisis were obvious and the consequences predictable.  “Contagion” 
entered the financial lexicon.
Thus the role of the FSF was to promote financial stability across 
national borders and provide an early warning system, identifying 
potential weaknesses or “vulnerabilities” in national financial systems,
with a view to preventing a repetition of the localized financial chaos of 
1997.  The development of international standards for financial and
other commercial regulation and the implementation by the IMF and the
World Bank of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP)— 
1. Gunther Teubner, Univ. of Frankfurt Professor of Private Law and Legal Sociology,
Two Kinds of Legal Pluralism: Collision of Rules in the Double Fragmentation of World
Society, Inaugural Speech Delivered to the Comparative Law, Economics and Finance 
Program, International University College Torino (It.) (Oct. 31, 2008). 
2. Although the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank sit across the street 
from each other in Washington, D.C., the institutional cultures are very different and 
their rivalry notorious. 
3. See History, FIN. STABILITY BD., http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/ 
history.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2010). See also Douglas W. Arner & Michael W. Taylor, The
Global Financial Crisis and the Financial Stability Board:  Hardening the Soft Law of
International Financial Regulation, 32 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 488, 489 (2009). 
4. China and Vietnam, for example, with their then relatively closed economies. 
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which is designed to monitor and assess financial stability on a country
by country basis—were two of the initiatives associated with the FSF. 
The Asian Financial Crisis, however, was just a tremor compared to 
the earthquake of the global financial crisis of 2008 (GFC), which has 
shaken financial markets around the world, less than a decade after the 
establishment of the FSF.
That the FSF was a failure is patently obvious.  It has been relegated 
to the dustbin of history with little ado.  This paper will endeavour to 
identify some of the proximate causes of the GFC in light of popular
theories of finance and how the nature of the crisis revealed the
inadequacies of both the FSF and the instrumentalities it relied on to
fulfill its mandate, international standard setting and financial sector 
assessment initiatives.  The paper concludes with a preliminary assessment 
of the prospects for the newly constituted Financial Stability Board 
(FSB) which has replaced the FSF. 
II. THE CRISIS: SOME PROXIMATE CAUSES AND A LITTLE THEORY
It was everyone’s worst nightmare: the spectre of systemic collapse. 
And this time, everyone was in it together.  Financial crises are no strangers 
to world economies in recent times.  But this one was truly different, 
stunning in its breadth, speed, and dramatic consequences.
Around the world, hundreds of millions of people were affected. 
Shocked and dismayed, people asked how and why, and the most puzzling 
questions of all, why here and why now.  As a modicum of normality
returns to financial markets, a torrent of analysis has started to spew
forth. There is agitated finger-pointing and second-guessing; some sacred 
cows of modern finance, such as the efficient market hypothesis,5 have 
taken a goring but will likely survive. On the other hand, more marginal 
theories which contribute to the understanding of modern finance, such
5. For the lively debate, see Efficiency and Beyond, ECONOMIST, July 18, 2009, at 68 
(noting that “[i]n 1978 Michael Jensen, an American economist, boldly declared that
‘there is no other proposition in economics which has more solid empirical evidence supporting 
it than the efficient- markets-hypothesis (EMH) . . . Eugene Fama, of the University of Chicago,
defined its essence:  that the price of a financial asset reflects all available information
that is relevant to its value…On such ideas, and on the complex mathematics that described
them, was founded the Wall Street profession of financial engineering.  The engineers
designed derivatives and securitizations [sic] from simple interest-rate options to ever 
more intricate credit default swaps and collateralised [sic] debt obligations.  All the while, 
confident in the theoretical underpinnings of their inventions, they reassured any doubters
that all this activity was not just making bankers rich.  It was making the financial system
safer and the economy healthier.  That is why many people view the financial crisis that
began in 2007 as a devastating blow to the credibility not only of banks but also of the entire
academic discipline of financial economics.”). 
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as the chaos theory and the path dependency of market institutions, have 
received resounding validation.6 
A. Immediate Culprits in the Global Financial Crisis 
1. The New Financial Products 
The complexity of modern finance is one obvious culprit:7 
We have reached the point where some financial engineers have managed to baffle 
even themselves.  Along the way, though, they seemed to have befuddled their boards 
of directors, risk management committees, lawyers, accountants, customers, and
regulators. A large financial institution cannot go from booking a position at par one
day to writing off $20 billion of the value of that position three months later, without 
admitting a degree of confusion about the investment’s true risk profile.8 
Brilliant innovation in financial products metamorphosed into 
incomprehensible gibberish: 
What started out as an I lend-you borrow proposition developed into something 
like this: ‘A Cayman Island special purpose bankruptcy-proof vehicle borrows 
money from qualified institutional buyers in order to acquire a credit-linked note 
issued by a Luxembourg entity, guaranteed by a Jersey financing subsidiary of a 
Cyprus corporation that in turn hedges the risk with a credit default swap written by
an Irish entity . . .’ And so on.9 
Such gibberish roared through Wall Street, meeting no resistance,
regulatory or otherwise.10 
Centuries old legal principles, such as the notion of “insurable interest,”11 
were cast aside. In English law, the concept of  insurable interest found
6. See John Authers, Wanted: New Model for Market, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at 9,
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cefa0bfa-ac58-11de-a754-00144feabdc0.html (last 
viewed Aug. 11, 2010). 
7. See Lee C. Buchheit, Did We Make Things Too Complicated?, 27 INT’L FIN. L.
REV. 24, 24 (2008). See also Michael Lewis, The End, PORTFOLIO, Nov. 11, 2008, available
at http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/national-news/portfolio/2008/11/11/The-End-of- 
Wall-Streets-Boom.
 8. Buchheit, supra note 7, at 25. 
9. Id.
10. Buchheit does not spare his fellow lawyers in this critique:  “Why do some
contracts, tantamount to crimes against humanity, not occasion more expressions of outrage 
from bankers, analysts, rating agencies, investors and regulators? (They do sometimes incur 
the wrath of the judiciary).  These people often meekly accept a turgid, incestuous, redundant,
disorganised and arthritic contract without even a bleat of protest. “ Buchheit, supra note 
7, at 26. 
11. See English & Scottish Law Commissions, Insurable Interest 2 (Issues Paper
No. 4, Jan. 14, 2008), available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/Insurance_Contract_ 
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its expression in the Life Assurance Act 1774: “Whereas it hath been
found by experience that the making insurances on lives or other events 
wherein the assured shall have no interest hath introduced a mischievous 
kind of gaming,”12 the mischievous kind of gaming being the  incentive
to murder an insured party.
The issue of whether credit derivatives (the financial product that 
felled AIG, then the largest insurance company in the world) were
“insurance” was one of the questions considered by Law Commission in 
the United Kingdom in a 2008 Issue Paper on insurable interests.13 
Although credit derivatives (a category of “toxic asset”) plainly came 
within one of the common law definitions of insurance,14 both the U.K.
regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), and the industry
association, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA), argued against their characterization as insurance and, thus, 
their regulation.15  “The FSA doubts there is a strong regulatory interest 
in the use to which insurance (or any other financial instrument) is 
put.”16  It is hard to imagine these words being uttered by a financial 
regulator today.  It is as though the regulators of some of the world’s
major financial markets went through a period of mass hysteria, blinded
by the brilliance of the markets.  In fact, a requirement similar to
“insurable interest” has now been proposed for credit derivatives,17 in 
order to defuse the moral hazard associated with their usage.   
Equally, old fashioned “gaming laws,” which had once served to
dampen the worst aspects of rampant speculation, no longer operated as
Law_Issues_Paper_4.pdf (“At its simplest, the doctrine of insurable interest requires that
someone taking out insurance gains a benefit from the preservation of the subject matter of the
insurance or suffers a disadvantage should it be lost.”). This paper, in positing that the issue
should have been left to the market, noted that Australia eliminated the requirement for
an insurable interest in an insurance contract in 1995 by an amendment to the Insurance 
Contracts Act 1984 (Cth). See id. app. A, at 71–73. See also M. Todd Henderson, Credit
Derivatives Are Not ‘Insurance,’ 16 CONN. INS. L. J. 1, 11, 17, 32–33 (2009–10). 
12. Life Assurance Act 1774, 14 Geo. 3, c. 48 (Eng.), reprinted in English & Scottish 
Law Commissions, supra note 11, app. B, at 79. 
13. See English & Scottish Law Commissions, supra note 11, at 47–50. 
14. See id. at 48 (“They are contracts whereby one party promises to pay to the other 
party a sum of money upon the occurrence of a specified event.”). 
15. See id. at 48–49 (“[A]ny review of the boundary between contracts of insurance 
and other types of contract risks damaging [market] consensus and undermining confidence in
these economically significant products.”).
16. See id. at 47. 
17. For example there have been calls for “more skin in the game.” One proposal
is to require purchasers of credit derivatives to actually hold the underlying bond against 
which default protection is sought, in effect requiring an “insurable interest.” See Reforming 
Finance—Derivatives—Naked Fear, ECONOMIST, Aug. 8, 2009, at 64. 
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a brake.18  The United Kingdom, for example, repealed the Gaming Act 
1845 by enacting the Gambling Act 2005, which came into effect
September 1, 2007.19 
The nature of the new financial products though was the key to their 
consequences in the United States. Unlike financial products of the past, 
these new inventions linked routine retail banking directly to supercharged 
capital markets—Main Street to Wall Street.  This was not just a housing 
bubble bursting; it was not just a credit crisis; it was not just a stock
market crash. The new hybrid financial products, by linking heretofore 
loosely correlated markets, became purveyors of systemic risk.
For the most part, the new financial products flew under the radar 
screen of regulatory oversight, investor reliance being put instead on
credit ratings. Structured products, as they were called, were deliberately
“structured” to avoid tripping regulatory triggers.  Particularly in the 
United States, this was facilitated by a fragmented and outdated financial
regulatory regime which provided a wealth of opportunities for regulatory
arbitrage.20  Elsewhere, as in the United Kingdom, regulatory authorities
were lulled by the siren song of “regulation-lite.” 
2. Ideology and Denial
Exacerbating what might have been a predictable, and ultimately 
welcome, correction in an overheated housing market in the United
States, were foolish and irresponsible lending practices, far down the 
financial chain.21  The manner in which these practices worked their way 
18. See Lynn Stout, How Deregulating Derivatives Led to Disaster, and Why Re-
Regulating Them Can Prevent Another, 1 LOMBARD STREET 4–9 (July 6, 2009), http://www. 
finreg21.com/files/finreg21-finreg21/Lombard%207.pdf. 
19. Gaming Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 109 (Eng.); Gambling Act, 2005, c. 19 
(Eng.).
20. The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, 7. U.S.C. §§ 1–25, had 
essentially exempted OTC derivatives from regulation by either the CFTC or the SEC.
In the wake of the global financial crisis, the United States Treasury sent to Congress the
Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of 2009, stating, “the OTC derivative markets 
will be comprehensively regulated for the first time.” Press Release TG-261, U.S. Dep’t
of the Treas., Administration’s Regulatory Reform Agenda Reaches New Milestone: Final 
Piece of Legislative Language Delivered to Capital Hill, (Aug. 11, 2009), http://www.
treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg261.aspx. 
21. One of the most striking examples given by Michael Lewis is of the non-
English speaking Mexican strawberry picker in California’s San Fernando Valley. With an
annual income of $14,000, he was given a mortgage to purchase a $720,000 house. See
Lewis, supra note 7. 
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through the financial system is in part a testimony to the dangers of
ideologically driven policymaking and denial in the face of imminent 
disaster.
Had the U.S. Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury moved more 
quickly, would the crisis have been contained?  The Hong Kong
Government did not let ideological scruples deter their quick and 
decisive action in creating the Tracker Fund in the face of the Asian
financial crisis a decade before.22  That the Hong Kong Government 
made a tidy profit in the long term was a sweet vindication, given the 
immediate criticisms their “anti-market” actions attracted, in particular 
from international financial institutions, such as the IMF. 
3. Chaos and Contagion
In the United States, the hurricane of financial chaos slammed against 
a creaking and outdated regulatory infrastructure.  At the eye of the storm,
was the fragmented financial and banking regulatory regime: dozens of
state regulators interacting with an array of different types of financial
institutions, grinding against the rocks of the Federal Reserve and the
U.S. Treasury.23 
The hurricane of the financial crisis is no idle metaphor.  Chaos theory, 
which has been applied to financial systems, originated in the study of 
weather systems.24  The so-called “butterfly effect” (does the flapping of
22. “In August 1998, the Hong Kong Government acquired a substantial portfolio 
of Hong Kong shares during a market operation. The Exchange Fund Investment Limited
(EFIL) was established in October 1998 by the Government to advise on the disposal of
this portfolio in an orderly manner.  When seeking to dispose of these shares, the Government
chose a stock neutral solution that would create minimal disruption to the market. An 
Exchange Traded Fund, the Tracker Fund of Hong Kong (TraHK), which met these
requirements and added depth to Hong Kong’s capital markets was launched in November
1999 as the first step in the Government’s disposal programme. State Street Global Advisors
Asia Ltd was appointed as the Fund Manager and State Street Bank and Trust Company
was appointed as the Trustee of TraHK. With an issue size of $33.3 billion (H.K.)
(approximately $4.3 billion (U.S.)), TraHK’s Initial Public Offering (IPO) was the largest IPO
ever in Asia ex-Japan at the time of launch. Since the IPO, approximately $140.4 billion 
(H.K.) (by October 15, 2002) in Hang Seng Index constituent stocks has been returned to 
the market through TraHK’s unique tap mechanism.” History of Tracker Fund, TRACKER
FUND OF HONG KONG, http://www.trahk.com.hk/eng/homepage.asp (last visited Feb.
20,2010). See also Y.C. Jao, Financial Reform in Hong Kong, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK 
ON FINANCIAL REFORM 126 (Maximillian J.B.Hall ed., 2003). 
23. There are literally hundreds of state insurance, credit, banking and
securities regulators in the United States in addition to their federal counterparts. See, e.g., 
FED. CITIZEN INFO. CTR., U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., CONSUMER ACTION HANDBOOK, 143– 
47 (2010), available at http://www.consumeraction.gov/viewpdf.shtml; NASAA Member
Representative List, NASAA, available at http://www.nasaa.org/about_nasaa/2062.cfm 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2010). 
24. Edward N. Lorenz, Professor of Meteorology, Predictability: Does the Flap of 
a Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil Set Off a Tornado in Texas?, Speech Delivered at the American
340
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a butterfly’s wings in Brazil set off a tornado in Texas) postulates that a
small change in initial conditions in a system causes a chain of events 
leading to large scale phenomenon.  Rather than being random or
unpredictable (the title of Lorenz’s seminal 1972 study was Predictability, 
after all), the future dynamics in the system are fully defined by initial
conditions.  As the noted German legal scholar Gunther Teubner recently 
observed, the “financial system has been a victim of its own rationality.”25 
If there had been any doubt as to the extent of integration of world
capital markets forming one “system,” this global financial crisis laid it
to rest. “Contagion” had spread rapidly during the Asian financial crisis 
in 1997–1998, but was more or less regionally contained, and, even 
within the region, had little effect on certain economies.26  Not so this
time.
Capital markets feed on information.27  Information is now transmitted
instantaneously, thanks to modern technology.  This same technology, of
course, permits the virtually instantaneous transmission of capital.  When
someone cries “fire” and there is a stampede for the door, this same 
technology fuels the conflagration in the markets, and also makes it 
possible.28 
Two other factors acted as accelerants in the case of this particular
conflagration: (1) ideology and (2) the propagation of what might, for 
want of a better term, be called “false cognates” or “false friends.”29  In 
Association for the Advancement of Science, 139th Meeting (Dec. 29, 1972). See also
Authers, supra note 6. 
25. Teubner, supra note 1.
26. Relatively “closed” economies of the time, China and Vietnam, for example. 
27. Cf. Efficiency and Beyond, supra note 5.
28. For the current debate on  “flash trading,” see Stephen Bernard, Meltdown 101:
‘Flash orders’ on Wall Street, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 13, 2009 (describing the practice 
of “certain members of exchanges—often large institutions—buying and selling information
about ongoing stock trades milliseconds before that information is made public).  High speed 
computer software can take advantage of that brief period between when an order is placed
and when it’s executed to all those members to potentially get better prices and profits by
slipping in and making the trade themselves.  Id. For example, if an exchange that offers
flash trading gets an order from someone who wants to sell shares of stock, it can ‘flash’
that order on its system to find a buyer, before making it available to buyers using other
exchanges. Id.  Traders pay fees to an exchange to access the information early. Id.  Three
large exchanges—Nasdaq, BATS and Direct Edge—have offered flash order services. Id. 
The Nasdaq OMX Group Inc. announced that they will voluntarily cease offering such services
September 1, 2009.  Associated Press, Nasdaq to Stop Offering Flash Trading September 1, 
MSNBC (Aug. 6, 2009, 2:29 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32317239.
29. “False cognates are pairs of words in the same or different languages that are 
similar in form and meaning but have different roots.  That is, they appear to be or
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September and October of 2008, the actions of the U.S. Federal Reserve 
and the U.S. Treasury themselves, the immediate solutions to the crisis, 
were a main driver of the chaos.  That an administration, at that time so
ideologically well-defined, engaged in a volte face intervention in 
financial markets of a kind unparalleled in U.S. history, pushed all the 
market panic buttons.  The message, the information, transmitted to the
market was very clear: this must be worse than we thought.
False cognates, or its variant, false friends, as they are known in 
linguistic studies, present different issues.  The problem (read, the crisis)
may appear the same in different places, but in fact, its origins are
different from one economy to another. Or, as with false friends (words 
that sound similar, and may in fact be related linguistically, but which
have strikingly different meanings from language to language), the 
problems may appear similar from economy to economy, but in fact 
their significance varies dramatically from one place to another. 
So, as the hue and cry about the U.S. financial crisis spread like 
electronic wildfire around the globe, with it were propagated, perhaps 
misconceived, assumptions as to the origins and consequences of financial 
crises in other economies.  Television coverage of a grandstanding U.S. 
congressman (on the eve of seeking re-election) picked up the phrase 
“greed and corruption on Wall Street.”  Within hours, Australia’s Prime 
Minister (his speech writer obviously having watched television the 
night before) lambastes “greed and lax regulation” in Australia.30 
Irrespective of the prevalence—or not—of greed and corruption on Wall
Street, had greed and lax regulation suddenly surged in Australia? 
Likely not.
4. False Cognates and False Friends 
The relative resilience of some economies to the financial crisis may 
be partly explained by this phenomenon.  A bank is a bank, and a 
mortgage is a mortgage, from Los Angeles to Toronto to Adelaide.  Or
are sometimes considered cognates when in fact they are not. Even if false cognates lack 
a common root, there may still be an indirect connection between them.” False Cognate, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/False_cognate (last modified Feb. 15, 2011, 3:44PM). 
“False friends (or faux amis) are pairs of words or phrases in two languages or dialects 
(or letters in two alphabets) that look or sound similar, but differ in meaning. The term
should be distinguished from “false cognates,” which are similar words in different languages
that appear to have a common historical linguistic origin (whatever their current meaning)
but actually do not.”  False Friend, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/False_friend 
(last modified Feb. 14, 2011, 10:50AM). 
30. Michelle Grattan & Julia Medew, Rudd War on Bankers’ Deals, THE AGE (Austl.), 
Oct. 16, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.theage.com.au/national/rudd-war-on-bankers- 
salary-deals-20081015-51jz.html. 
342
JORDAN ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/26/2011 3:41 PM     
  




















      
    
[VOL. 12:  333, 2011] The Dangerous Illusion
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
are they?  Share prices in Canadian banks plummeted at the height of the 
crisis, seemingly infected by financial crisis flu.  Yet Canadian banks 
had not engaged in the lending practices which brought low U.S. 
mortgage lenders and the structural weaknesses of the fragmented U.S. 
banking system were not present in Canada.31  These differences, this 
information, however, took much longer to percolate through the 
collective investment consciousness than the cry of fire which had set
markets tumbling.  But when the more accurate assessment of risk
gained greater currency, economies such as Canada and Australia appeared 
more “resilient” to the crisis. 
The point here is that instantaneous information flows may in fact 
propagate the equivalent of false cognates or false friends, creating a 
“problem” where none existed, or leading to misinterpretation of a very 
real problem.  In time, cooler heads may prevail and the existence or
sources of such problems themselves be reconsidered.In the interim,
however, an inappropriate regulatory response, also propagated by
international information flows, may have taken root.32  Information 
does drive markets, but not necessarily to the most obvious or most
desirable destination. 
B. Chaos and Path Dependency 
It is anomalous that a country such as the United States, noted, and
justly so, for its dynamic financial system, full of genius and innovation, 
should be burdened with such a difficult and obviously deficient regulatory
regime.  But that is the case.  Part of the problem is the political and
legislative system, with its exquisite checks and balances, and the key 
role played by lobbyists.  It is not that this system is any better or worse 
than any other.  It does, however, make legislative and regulatory reform 
in complex areas, such as finance, a slow and arduous process, except
possibly in times of crisis.33 
31. Canadian banks, though, are international institutional investors and, as such, did 
find “toxic assets” in their investment portfolios. 
32. For example, the notorious Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 207-204,
116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.), passed in the 
United States, provoked a rash of look-alike legislative and other initiatives around the world.
See, e.g., Tobias Buck, EU Company Auditing Proposal is Toned Down After Protests, FIN.
TIMES (U.K.), June 22, 2005, at 2 (discussing the defeat of a proposal in the European
Parliament to require audit committees on a pan-European basis). 
33. Some financial sector reforms in the U.S., such as abolition of the McFadden Act
and the Glass-Steagall Act, took decades.  WILLIAM L. MEGGINSON & SCOTT B. SMART,
 343












      








    
   
 
   
   
    
 
     
  
  
    
At the heart of this financial crisis is the fragmented, inefficient 
banking system and its regulation in the United States.  There are thousands
of credit institutions, of various kinds, each subject to a multiplicity of 
regulators. Opportunities for regulatory arbitrage, lax oversight, and
imprudent practices leading to systemic failures abound.  There is 
nothing new here.  The same industry, mortgage lending, was the center 
of the savings and loans crisis in the 1980s, which resulted in a public 
rescue effort in the form of the Resolution Trust Corporation. 
Over a dozen years ago, possibly prompted by the earlier savings and 
loans crisis in the United States, Mark Roe34 examined the U.S. financial 
system through the prism of chaos theory, concepts of path dependency,
and evolutionary biology.35  The argument was a counterpoint to
prevalent law and economics views of the U.S. market inspired by the 
efficient market hypothesis.36 
In looking at the U.S. financial system, Roe noted: 
[W]hat survives depends not just on efficiency but on the initial, often accidental
conditions (chaos theory), on the history of the problems that had to be solved in
the past but that may be irrelevant today (path dependence), and on evolutionary
accidents—what might do best today could have been selected out for extinction in
the past.37 
The nature of financial institutions and their regulation in the United 
States are hard to change.  The institutions and their regulation date 
back, not just decades, but to decisions made early in the nation’s
history.  Not only did the United States break away politically from 
Britain in the late eighteenth-century, but it also broke away from British
legislative and institutional traditions—including the British banking 
system.
INTRODUCTION TO CORPORATE FINANCE 455  (2d ed. 2008).  Others, such as a comprehensive 
reform of securities regulation, the so-called “aircraft carrier” proposals of 1998, never
saw the light of day. Id.
34. Now at Harvard Law School. 
35. Mark Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV.
641, 641 (1996). 
36. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the efficient market hypothesis
over the last several decades. It is now undergoing serious questioning, see Efficiency and 
Beyond, supra note 5, but its tenets have been such an accepted part of financial market 
theory that not only do they implicitly underpin regulatory initiatives, but are actually
made explicit in statutory provisions.  For example, in the United States., the Securities 
Act of 1933 provides that “[w]henever pursuant to this title the Commission is engaged in 
rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the
protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation.”  15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2000). 
37. Roe, supra note 35, at 641. 
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The fragmented, small local banking system (and the seeds of the
present global financial crisis), originated in the 1830s.  “Andrew
Jackson’s destruction of the Second Bank of the United States . . . 
yielded weak financial institutions that today would be out of place in 
America, which is now a nation of large businesses and which could
well absorb large-scale finance.”38  According to Roe, U.S. capital markets
developed to the extent they have to compensate for the inefficiencies of
the banking institutions.39  So it is not surprising, in the overall scheme 
of the U.S. financial system, to see the creation of financial products 
(those “toxic assets”) which transfer risk from the banking sector to the 
capital markets. 
Chaos theory does provide some intriguing insights into the current 
financial crisis.  As Roe suggests, dysfunctional aspects of the current 
system of financial regulation in the United States, closely tied to this 
financial crisis, may be traced back to those initial conditions, decisions 
as to structure and regulatory philosophy of the early nineteenth-century. 
But the “butterfly effect” of chaos theory also appears to be operating— 
the exponential growth of perturbations from a small change in initial 
conditions. This suggests that international financial markets are now 
operating as a closed system, according to set rules producing predictable
results, the rationality suggested by Teubner. 
There are several implications to this observation.  First, why did so
few people see it coming?40  After all, the FSF, created in the aftermath 
of the Asian financial crisis, was dedicated to promoting international 
financial stability, as its name implies.41 Was the approach of the FSF, 
and its uncritical reliance on a hodgepodge of international standards, in 
the assessment of the stability of financial systems, fundamentally
flawed? Second, are there lessons to be learned from the resilience of
38. Id.  at 644. 
39. See Roe, supra note 35, at 645. 
40. With the benefit of hindsight, of course, there were the prescient few.  “The
banking world ignored Gillian Tett when she predicted the credit crisis two years ago.” 
See Laura Barton, On the Money, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 31, 2008, at 12, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/oct/31/creditcrunch-gillian-tett-financial-times. 
41. As a tacit admission of its blatant failure, the Financial Stability Forum has
been renamed the Financial Stability Board, and work is in progress to reformulate its
mission. See Press Release, Financial Stability Forum re-established as the Financial 
Stability Board, FIN. STABILITY F. (Apr. 2, 2009), www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/
pr_090402b.pdf. 
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certain economies?  Will these lessons be taken to heart by the successor
institution to the FSF, the recently constituted Financial Stability Board? 
III. CONTAGION AND PREDICTABILITY
The United States caught pneumonia; Canada and Australia got the 
sniffles. The seeming resilience of some economies, such as those of
Australia and Canada, to the worst of the financial crisis puts into question
at least some aspects of the international best practice and international
standards approach endorsed by the FSF.  The FSF supports the Financial 
Sector Assessment process conducted by the IMF and the World Bank.
Although it maybe too soon to judge whether the resilience demonstrated
by Canada and Australia is real or a temporary mirage, it does suggest 
that diversity (like the rain forest for the planet) is a good thing for 
financial systems.
A second issue is the failure of the FSF to predict, much less avoid, 
the financial storm that was brewing.  The following sections of this 
paper will attempt to tease out some tentative reasons for this failure, 
and its implications for the future. 
A. The Role of the FSF and the FSAP
Chaos theory, as applied to financial systems, would suggest that crises, 
like hurricanes, are predictable.  The question then is why so many were 
caught unawares by this one, and in particular, the FSF.  The FSF was 
created in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of a decade earlier
specifically to detect “vulnerabilities” in financial systems and serve as 
an early warning system; it was caught flat-footed.42 
This was despite the mass of information collected by bodies such as
the IMF and the World Bank pursuant to the FSF-mandated FSAP.  It is 
hard to escape the conclusion that the FSAP, conducted on a country by
country basis using various international standards, were, at least to a 
certain extent, asking the wrong questions.  Initial conditions were not 
being correctly identified and regulatory responses were being misinterpreted. 
The widespread adoption of such top-down, assumption-riddled
standards and their use as indicators of potential financial instability,
should have been put into serious question by this financial crisis. 
Unfortunately, judging from the initial responses, there is a risk of more 
of the same, just more of it.  “Broader reform could be achieved by
creating a ministerial body with decision-making powers not inside but 
above the [International Monetary] Fund.  It would also be responsible
42. See Arner & Taylor, supra note 3, at 490. 
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for political supervision of the other international institutions, including 
the World Bank, the Financial Stability Board, and the World Trade 
Organisation.”43  Such suggestions are a variation on the “World Financial 
Authority” idea floated several years ago by Eatwell and Taylor,44 and 
recently called an “unrealistic yet notorious—proposal.”45  It is hard to  
escape the conclusion that promotion of simplistic, high level, “solutions”
to complex and deep-rooted structural problems in various parts of the 
global financial system are “quick fixes.”46 
1. The FSF and Soft Law
The FSF was envisaged as a “grouping of technocratic authorities with 
relevant expertise and experience.”47  Representatives of central banks
and ministries of finance met on a regular basis with a view to promoting 
convergence to minimum standards in the form of “soft law,” with
compliance by force of example and moral suasion.48  For  the  
implementation phase, the IMF and the World Bank were recruited to 
carry out financial sector assessments on a country by country basis. 
The financial crisis, however, raises serious doubts as to the utility of 
these exercises and painfully highlights the ineffectiveness of the FSF.
As Arner and Taylor point out, the crisis has put into question the 
international “soft law” approach and the workings of “policy
networks.”49 With the FSF, it was “not at all clear what action will 
43. Timothy Adams & Arrigo Sadun, Op-Ed., Global Economic Council Should
Oversee All, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), Aug. 16, 2009, at 9. 
44. See John Eatwell & Lance Taylor, A World Financial Authority, in INTERNATIONAL 
CAPITAL MARKETS: SYSTEMS IN TRANSITION 17 (2002). 
 45. Régis Bismuth, The Independence of Domestic Financial Regulators: 
An Underestimated Structural Issue in International Financial Governance, 2 GOETTINGEN J.
INT’L L. 93, 108–09 (2010). 
46. “Admittedly, the G20 has entrusted the Financial Stability Board with the mission 
of monitoring the standard-setting activity and has mandated the Basel Committee, IOSCO 
and the IAIS (among others) with the task of developing new rules.  However, this choice 
seems more a quick-fix than a sustainable strategy.  It will neither preserve state unity on
the international stage, nor solve the issues of circumvention of national and
regional democratic processes.” Id. at 108.
 47. Arner & Taylor, supra note 3, at 491. See also Enrique R. Carrasco, Crisis and 
Opportunity: How the Global Financial Crisis May Give Emerging Economics Greater 
Voice in International Finance via the Financial Stability Board 8–10 (Univ. of Iowa Legal
Studies, Research Paper No. 09-43, Dec. 2009); available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1477975. 
48. Arner & Taylor, supra note 3, at 489. 
49. Id. at 491. 
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follow . . . or, indeed, who will act.”50  Eatwell called the FSF a “think 
tank with nowhere to go.”51  Not only did the FSF toil in obscurity, it 
was “invisible.”52  The obscurity of the FSF, its private membership,
may have detracted from its perceived legitimacy.53 
The invisibility of the FSF was related to its predilection for “soft
law” approaches.  Lacking the transparency and contestation54 of the
legislative process, soft law is easy.  Everything happens behind the scenes, 
away from the glare of the press and the inconvenience of serious 
questioning.  Consensus rules, and since it must, hard questions go 
unadressed. The product of the soft law process has an airy vagueness to
it, lacking in the detail and sharp edges of legislation.
“Hard law” is hard. Making law can be a messy, fraught process 
(sometimes compared to sausage making); a hard slog on the technical
details; hard choices on difficult or controversial issues.  Sometimes the
result is less than optimal—think Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200255 which 
was a rushed response to a perceived crisis; and other times, the result
can be brilliant and enduring—think the French Civil Code.  But the 
process, in the democracies and elsewhere too, is a relatively public 
process, and one open to contestation. 
But even “soft law” has shown some arthritic symptoms.  In theory, one
of the advantages of soft law is said to be that it can be easily changed, 
responsive to fast moving events, given that it bypasses the time-consuming 
legislative process. But that has not necessarily been the case; path 
dependency operates to preserve the less than optimal elements of soft 
law as well as hard law. 
The International Organization of Securities Comissions’ (IOSCO)
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, one of the FSF-
mandated international standards discussed below, is an example.56  To 
its credit, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) has been much more proactive in learning from experience with
50. John Eatwell, The Challenges Facing International Financial Regulation, Paper
Presented at the Western Economic Association International Conference, at 14 (July 4–
8, 2001), available at http://www.financialpolicy.org/DSCEatwell.pdf. 
51. Id.
52. See Barton, supra note 40. 
53. See Bismuth, supra note 45, at 108 (arguing that the FSF and FSB approach 
amounts to a “circumvention of national and regional democratic processes”). 
54. See Arner & Taylor, supra note 3, at 494. 
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2006). 
56. OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION, INT’L ORG. SEC.
COMMISSIONS, (2003), available at www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf. 
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principles which it devises, such as the OECD Principles of Corporate
Governance, another of the FSF-mandated international standards.57 
2. The FSAP Experience
Implementation of the FSF agenda focused primarily on the use of the 
FSAP, the Financial Sector Assessments conducted by the IMF in
developed economies, and jointly by the IMF and the World Bank in
developing economies.  The mandate was to identify “vulnerabilities” in 
financial systems, on a country by country basis, with a view to nipping 
financial crises in the bud.  In particular, priority was to be given to 
systematically important countries.  The FSF identified tweleve international
standards to be used in the process of “benchmarking” or “rating” a 
financial system.58 
The FSAPs produced a veritable gold mine of data over time.59 
Unfortunately, some of the data is of dubious reliability and quality, for
a number of reasons.  The international standards themselves are not of 
the same caliber.  Among the twelve international standards chosen by
the FSF, there is overlap, duplication, and inconsistency.  The methodology
of the FSAP process was in a constant state of flux.  The teams themselves 
conducting the FSAPs varied in expertise and sophistication.  Querelles
de chapelle60 between the IMF and the World Bank teams were not
unheard of.
Nevertheless, the data accumulated was impressive; the difficulty has 
been that it cannot be used in a narrow, scientific way, given its
deficiencies. Rather, it needs a kind of qualitative interpretation which
has not always been possible.  With hindsight, some of the observations 
appear spot on.  Iceland was identified as vulnerable as far back as 2002. 
57. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf. 
(last viewed on Nov. 17, 2010). 
58. See 12 Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems, FIN. STABILITY BD., http://
www. financialstabilityboard.org/cos/key_standards.htm.
59. This huge volume of data does not seem to find its way readily into the academic 
literature, although several people at the IMF, in particular, Jennifer Elliott, have laudably
been publishing papers making use of the data.  See, e.g., Ana Carvajal & Jennifer Elliott, The 
Change of Enforcement in Securities Markets: Mission Impossible (Int’l Monetary Fund, 
Working Paper No. 09/168, Aug. 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1457591 (last 
viewed Nov. 17, 2010). 
60. The expression refers to pointless internal disputes and rivalries within an
organization. 
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The importance of supervision and risk assessment of large, complex
financial institutions was also recognized early on.  Difficulties with 
some of the standards, such as the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of 
Securities Regulation (IOSCO Principles), were noted.61  Given the
volume of data and its variable quality, however, important observations 
may have been lost in the “noise.” 
B. Inadequacies of the FSAP Experience 
Most importantly, the FSAPs were sometimes asking the wrong 
questions, failing to identify the operative “initial conditions” important 
to chaos theory and thus the direction and magnitude of the perturbations 
to follow. Some international standards failed to differentiate among
financial markets in different parts of the world, or to recognize the 
stratification of any one particular market.  Financial markets, even
internal domestic ones, are not monolithic.  Most ironically, for standards 
billing themselves as “international,” many of the standards employed 
completely missed the international and cross-border aspects of financial
markets.  This was due to the fact that many of the so-called “international”
standards were simply reheated domestic regulation, which did not look 
to international dimensions of an issue. 
1. Problems with Execution of the FSAP Exercises
Both the IMF and the World Bank periodically engage in evaluations 
of their work product; the FSAPs, like other programs, have been
subjected to critical internal scrutiny.  In 2006 an evaluation of the FSAP 
program62 by the IMF noted that there had been an improvement in the
quality of execution but that the program was at a “critical crossroads.”63 
Inconsistencies in execution and results persisted despite the introduction 
of detailed “methodologies.”  The quality of the data itself was not subject 
to rigorous enough scrutiny.  One continuing problem was the “parachute”
approach; the IMF teams of experts, including the World Bank if involved, 
parachuted in and out of countries, never spending enough time to absorb 
country specific circumstances.  Some analysis and “ratings” indicated a 
61. They are not designed to identify systemic risk; rather they focus on investor 
protection and traditional structures of a securities regulatory regime. 
62. INDEP. EVALUATION OFFICE, INT’L MONETARY FUND, REPORT ON THE EVALUATION 
OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM 6–7 (Jan. 5, 2006), available at http://
www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/2006/fsap/eng/pdf/report.pdf. See also  INT’L MONETARY FUND
& WORLD BANK, THE FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM AFTER TEN YEARS:
EXPERIENCES AND REFORMS FOR THE NEXT DECADE (Aug. 28, 2009), available at http://
www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/082809B.pdf (subsequent review of FSAP). 
63. INDEP. EVALUATION OFFICE, supra note 62, at 6.
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“check the box” mentality,64 more egregiously manifesting itself in
standardized advice being given, irrespective of the country involved.65 
In the words of the 2006 IMF evaluation, “overly simplistic” messages
were being conveyed with respect to the strength of the financial system 
in any one country.  The evaluation called for more subtle interpretation 
of the results which could form the basis of “health warnings.” 
A more controversial aspect of the FSAP experience, and one which
may account for the inconsistencies and variability of the results, focuses 
on the level of technical skills within the IMF (and the World Bank) to 
conduct the exercises.  A former member of the executive boards of the
IMF and the World Bank groups points to the “various recent
independent evaluations [that] have noticed the persistence of technical
and organizational weaknesses that impair the IMF’s ability to integrate 
macroeconomic and financial sector analyses, and to draw credible risk 
indications from them . . . Notwithstanding follow-up action from the 
IMF, the opinion remains today widespread that the technical skills of its 
economists are inadequate to understand the financial markets, and to
appreciate how they interact with the real economy.”66 
One obvious difficulty with the technical proficiency of IMF (and
World Bank) staff conducting FSAPs has perhaps been too obvious to
merit mention in the critiques of the process.  Financial regulation is law,
and law of a particularly technical kind, strongly influenced by practitioners 
of the financial arts and massaged by political process.67  In the area of 
capital markets regulation in particular, economists, for better or for 
worse, are conspicuously absent from the law-making processes.  The 
IMF and the World Bank, on the other hand, are institutions bursting at 
the seams with economists.  A few lawyers operate undercover, disguising 
themselves as financial or private sector specialists, and outside consultants,
64. Id. at 11 (referring to a “checklist approach”).
65. A possibly apocryphal story circulated at one time that sometimes the same advice 
was given, country by country, without even a change in the name of the country.
66. Biagio Bossone, The IMF, the U.S. Subprime Crisis, and Global Financial
Governance, VOXEU (Feb. 3, 2009), http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/2973. Bossone
cites several examples of IMF statements in 2007 which indicate obliviousness to the impending
financial disaster:  “. . . in the summer of 2007, the IMF staff indicated that in the United
States ‘[c]ore commercial and investment banks are in a sound financial position, and
systemic risks appear low’[citation omitted].” Id.
67. It is notable that during the period leading up to the global financial crisis, the 
World Bank was winding down its Financial Sector Development Vice-Presidency.  Some of
the first professionals to go were those with legal training. 
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who may incidentally (and, incidentally is the operative word here) have 
legal training, are often brought in to participate in the FSAP exercises.68 
However, within the IMF and the World Bank, the process and results 
of the FSAP exercises remain dominated by an academic and somewhat
“econocentric” view of the financial world.  Internal legal expertise is 
scarce (most of the financial sector legal expertise being concentrated in 
internal Treasury and co-financing operations).  Despite the reams of
advice dispensed as to regulatory reforms in the financial sector, one 
would be hard pressed to find more than a handful of staff in these
institutions who have actually read, much less fully understood, a 
comprehensive set of financial sector regulations, such as the U.S. 
securities regulatory regime (which has served as model to innumerable 
reforms propagated around the world).
There are several implications resulting from this paucity of legal
expertise applied to financial sector initiatives at the IMF and the World
Bank.  Lawyers dominate the operation of many financial regulatory
regimes around the world—as well as being responsible for creating them. 
Economists and lawyers often have difficulty communicating with one 
another, given the assumptions and confines of their intellectual and 
professional frameworks. 
The other implication may be explanatory of the sometimes inept use 
to which international standards have been put and the conclusions
drawn from their inexpert application (the “check the box” mentality 
observed by the independent evaluations of the FSAP process).  Some
international standards, such as the IOSCO Principles, were originally
developed by regulators (read lawyers), for use by other regulators (read
lawyers) in the creation or critical self-assessment of regulatory regimes 
(read law). They were not designed for use by non-professionals and 
pre-date the FSAP exercises.  There may even have been some dismay
on the part of various IOSCO committee members (regulators all), as to
the amateurish uses to which their principles were being put in the FSAP
exercises.  In any event, in 2003, IOSCO created a detailed “methodology”
to accompany the IOSCO Principles, targeted largely to FSAP participants, 
in an effort to maintain the integrity of interpretation and promote a 
more informed use of the principles. 
The number of codes and standards used in the FSAP process has also 
been a problem. As noted above, the standards varied greatly in their 
68. World Bank and IMF legal departments are primarily service departments for
the internal governance and operational activities of the institutions.  In the last decade, some
efforts have been made to broaden the scope of activities, at least at the World Bank, by
the creation of various thematic groups with more specialized expertise, in addition to the 
groupings of lawyers organized by region. 
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origins and level of sophistication and continue to demonstrate overlap
and inconsistencies.  Inadequate integration of the results diminished
their relevance.  As the “ratings” of countries on various standards began 
to circulate publicly, countries began “gaming” the system, by enacting
legislation or adopting measures that would “tick the boxes” without 
necessarily being of any effect.69 
As well, the voluntary nature of the FSAP process was problematic.
Canada, that boy scout of the international world, was the first country to 
volunteer, some say to its chagrin.70  However, as of the date of the 2006
IMF evaluation, “some 20 to 25% of countries that are ‘systemically
important’ and/or have vulnerable financial systems—two key criteria 
endorsed by the IMF and the World Bank Boards—have not been
assessed.”71  As of 2006, four systemically important countries in particular
stood out: Turkey, Indonesia, China, and most importantly of all, the 
United States.72 
In reacting to criticism that it did not see the global financial crisis 
coming, the IMF identified the failure of the United States to volunteer
for an FSAP as a major factor.73  The United States, for its part, had 
justified its objections to participating in the FSAP, by invoking the 
heavy burden such an assessment would place “on the scarce resources
of the [IMF].”74 
It may seem curious that the United States, which in fact was a driving 
force behind many of the international standards (sometimes for
69. See CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM: WHAT
CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND 
THE WORLD 47–173 (2008). See also Cally Jordan, The Conundrum of Corporate Governance, 
30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 983 (2005) (discussing Germany’s introduction of a voluntary code of
corporate governance).
70. Canada’s financial system, the star of the current financial crisis, was assessed as
being somewhat deficient when benchmarked against international standards. 
71. INDEP. EVALUATION OFFICE, supra note 62, at 7.
72. Turkey subsequently volunteered and the US finally permitted an FSAP to be
conducted in the wake of the global financial crisis. 
73. “The Fund has also deflected criticism of its failure to predict the crisis. Because
the United States refuses to be subject to an IMF Financial Sector Assessment Program 
(FSAP), Managing Director Strauss-Kahn argues, the Fund cannot be responsible for a lack
of supervision. The FSAP is one of the IMF’s main supervisory instruments, and it was 
not employed in the United States during the lead-up to the crisis.”  Laurie Glapa, The 
IMF Faces Post-Crisis Criticism, UNIV. OF IOWA CENTER FOR INT’L FIN. & DEV. (Oct. 15,
2009, 2:48 PM), http://uicifd.blogspot.com/2009/10/imf-faces-post-crisis-criticism.html. 
74. Bossone, supra note 66. 
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ideological and political reasons)75 and whose regulatory framework
defined the content of the standards themselves,76 for many years stubbornly
resisted volunteering for a financial sector assessment.  Putting aside 
tender concerns for the workload of IMF staff noted above, was this 
hubris, a misguided conviction as to the stability and superiority of the 
U.S. financial system?  Was it a “we have nothing to learn from anyone 
else” response? Rather, did it reflect awareness of the problems in the 
domestic financial regulatory structure, but the view that these problems
could be dealt with domestically given the vast resources at the disposal
of the United States? Was the U.S. financial system considered too 
complex to tackle (and too big to fail)?  Irrespective of the reasons, it is 
tragically ironic that the global financial crisis began as a failure in the
domestic U.S. regulatory structure, and one which, despite the inadequacies
of the various benchmarks and standards at the disposal of the IMF, 
would undoubtedly have been flagged by an FSAP.77 
The essentially domestic focus of the FSAP process has also been
singled out for criticism.  Although “contagion” had been a marked
phenomenon in the Asian financial crisis which led to the creation of the 
FSF and FSAPs, this was not an issue which was addressed in adequate 
manner by the FSAP process which ignored cross-border implications. 
As the 2006 IMF evaluation diplomatically put it: “Greater efforts by the 
IMF to distill common cross-country messages from the various FSAP
exercises would be welcome.”78 
Finally, updating FSAPs, especially in view of the constantly evolving 
methodologies, was problematic.  For any country, submitting to the 
highly intrusive, labor-intensive FSAP process was a chore and a burden; 
for smaller countries, or those with limited resources, handling the
logistics involved in meeting the demands of large teams of financial 
experts, was a brutally exhausting exercise.  And, like Canada perhaps, 
there were countries which felt they had been “burned” by the experience.
2. Problems with the Substance of the FSAP Exercise
The difficulties associated with execution of the FSAP program have 
been exacerbated by the substantive nature of some of the international 
standards (putting aside for the moment International Financial
Reporting Standards and the BIS Capital Adequacy standards which 
75. E.g., anti-money laundering (AML) and combating financing of terrorism (CFT). 
76. See, e.g., IOSCO, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION
(2003), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf. 
77. Arner & Taylor, supra note 3, at 495 (stating that the FSAP process was not designed
to deal with U.S. domestic problems in a predictive fashion or otherwise).
78. INDEP. EVALUATION OFFICE, supra note 62, at 5.
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have a long history behind them).  Some of the standards, unfortunately, 
have swallowed whole the precepts of an influential but misguided body 
of literature, usually referred to as the “law and finance” literature, 
which has subsequently been widely criticized on both the law and 
finance sides.79  As noted earlier, some “international” standards are not 
international at all, but rather reheated domestic, often U.S. domestic, 
law. The weakness, in this case, is that such standards are riddled with 
the hidden assumptions and deficiencies of their country of primary
origin.  And where that country of origin is the United States, implementing 
such standards (as is the ultimate goal of the FSAP exercise) may mean
adopting inappropriate and suboptimal regulatory approaches. 
For example, take the IOSCO Principles, one of the twelve international
standards mandated by the FSF, and referred to on several occasions 
above. Originally formulated in 1998, in the shadow of the Asian
financial crisis, the IOSCO Principles are backward looking, taking as 
their point of departure the institutions and regulatory framework of the 
United States, as it existed in the mid-1990s.  It is useful to cast one’s
mind back to the capital markets of the 1990s, to consider how
dramatically the world has changed, and, how dated the IOSCO Principles
are. At the time of their original formulation, for example, Dick Grasso
was still reigning over the New York Stock Exchange and its open 
outcry trading floor.  The idea of a transatlantic merger of the venerable 
old dame with the continental consolidated exchange, Euronext, would 
have been unthinkable. Alternative trading systems and online trading 
were just in their infancy. 
The IOSCO Principles, because they looked to the U.S. markets and 
regulation of the 1990s, subsumed the hidden assumptions of the time
and place, assumptions which lie deeply buried in their originating 
conditions, and are rarely explicitly acknowledged. First, there is the 
1930s emphasis on retail investors and equity trading.  Derivatives, of
course, are not on the radar screen (for the most part, they do not come
under the regulatory scope of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission), and debt markets virtually ignored (derivatives are usually 
structured as debt instruments).  The “unregulated” or private placement
markets (wherein hedge funds lurk) are also ignored, having received
79. The “law and finance” literature is voluminous. See generally Holger Spamann,
‘Law and Finance’ Revisited, (Harv. Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. For Law, Econ., & Bus.,
Discussion Paper No. 12, Feb. 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1095526. 
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perfunctory treatment in the 1930s legislative framework which still
governs in the United States. Securities were still pieces of paper in the
1930s, and the U.S. regulation continues to play catch up in terms of
recognizing the implications of the electronic age.  Faith in self-
regulatory market institutions remains a deeply entrenched notion in the 
United States and the efficient market hypothesis (a theory now somewhat
battered by the crisis) formally acknowledged in U.S. securities legislation.80 
Finally, U.S. regulation is notoriously domestically focused. 
These features of U.S. securities regulation shine through the IOSCO 
Principles. They are also the areas of weaknesses, in terms of where the
global financial crisis exerted its greatest pressures.  Utilizing the IOSCO 
Principles, the FSAP process, even at the best of times, would have detected 
these pressure points with difficulty.81 
For many years there had been a somewhat puzzling reluctance on the
part of IOSCO to seriously revisit the IOSCO Principles.82  In the years
80. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2006) (“Consideration of Promotion of Efficiency, 
Competition and Capital Formation—Whenever pursuant to this title the Commission is 
engaged in rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary
or appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the
protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation.”). 
81. Although there is little doubt that other standards and assessments would have
detected some of the greater institutional and regulatory weaknesses in the U.S. banking 
system.
82. In June 2010, IOSCO announced a major revision to the IOSCO Objectives and 
Principles of Securities Regulation, “. . . to incorporate eight new principles based on the 
lessons learned from the recent financial crisis and subsequent changes in the regulatory
environment, which are designed to strengthen the global regulatory system against future
crises. The eight new principles cover specific policy areas such as hedge funds, credit rating 
agencies and auditor independence and oversight, in addition to broader areas including
monitoring, mitigating and managing systemic risk; regularly reviewing the perimeter of 
regulation and requiring that conflicts of interest and misalignment of incentives are avoided,
eliminated, disclosed or otherwise managed.”  Media release, IOSCO, Global Securities 
Regulators Adopt New Principles and Increase Focus on Systemic Risk, IOSCO/MR/10, 
(June 10, 2010), http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS188.pdf [hereinafter IOSCO 
Media Release]. 
The eight new principles are:
• “Principle 6: The regulator should have or contribute to a process to monitor, 
mitigate and manage systemic risk, appropriate to its mandate;
• Principle 7: The regulator should have or contribute to a process to review the
perimeter of regulation regularly; 
• Principle 8: The regulator should seek to ensure that conflicts of interest and
misalignment of incentives are avoided, eliminated, disclosed or otherwise 
managed;
• Principle 19: Auditors should be subject to adequate levels of oversight; 
• Principle 20: Auditors should be independent of the issuing entity that they audit;
• Principle 22: Credit rating agencies should be subject to adequate levels of 
oversight. The regulatory system should ensure that credit rating agencies whose
ratings are used for regulatory purposes are subject to registration and ongoing
supervision; 
356
JORDAN ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/26/2011 3:41 PM     
  
   
 
 
   
   
 











    
   









[VOL. 12:  333, 2011] The Dangerous Illusion
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
between 1998 and 2010, there had been certainly enough experience 
with implementation and assessment (through self-assessments under the 
auspices of IOSCO itself as well as the FSAP process) to make the
limitations of the IOSCO Principles obvious.  But rather than reconsidering 
the substance in light of the recognition of new market conditions and 
regulatory approaches, there was fiddling at the margins, revisions to 
“methodology.”83  Revisions in 2008, according to IOSCO, were absolutely 
identical to 2003.84 
Could it be that the reluctance to completely revisit the IOSCO 
Principles derived in part from the transformation of the “soft law” 
principles into hard law regulation, in country after country in response 
to FSAP recommendations?85  It would be somewhat embarrassing for
the IMF and the World Bank teams to return to these countries, 
acknowledging perhaps that the IOSCO Principles were not optimal, for 
these countries’ markets, or any other modern markets for that matter. 
Even the revisions announced June 10, 2010, while adding eight new 
principles “based on the lessons learned from the recent financial crisis
and subsequent changes in the regulatory environment,”86 do not revisit
the original thirty principles and their underlying assumptions.  Importantly,
the eight new principles do recognize that the “financial markets which
IOSCO members regulate, or may be exempt from regulation, can be the
mechanism by which risk is transferred within the financial system” 
(emphasis added).87  Unregulated markets finally appear on the radar 
screen, and the markets themselves—not just institutions—are recognized
as systemically important. 
Criticism of the IOSCO Principles is not, in any way, to suggest that
IOSCO itself has been a flawed initiative.  Quite to the contrary, IOSCO 
has been a resounding success.  Its significance to international capital 
markets has been growing by leaps and bounds, and its members 
• Principle 23: Other entities that offer investors analytical or evaluative services
should be subject to oversight and regulation appropriate to the impact their
activities have on the market or the degree to which the regulatory system relies
on them; and
• Principle 28: Regulation should ensure that hedge funds and/or hedge funds
managers/advisers are subject to appropriate oversight.”  
Id.
83. See discussion supra at p. 21.
84. See infra note 103. 
85. This is to say nothing of the “country rankings” based on the FSAP exercises. 
86. IOSCO Media Release, supra note 82. 
87. Id.
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increasingly convinced of the importance of its mission.  IOSCO saw the 
crisis coming88 and continues to produce topical and informed reports on
a wide variety of timely issues, such as practices and requirements for 
asset-back securities, exchange traded funds, collective investment 
schemes, and unregulated markets.89 
Nevertheless, the original thirty IOSCO Principles remain untouched, 
an example of path dependency in action perhaps.  IOSCO has been
working around them, addressing significant issues outside the original 
IOSCO Principles, in new initiatives and reports, as well as by the addition 
of the eight new principles. The assumptions underlying the eight new
principles, however, are different (“regulation” has dethroned both the 
“efficient market” and “self-regulation”), thus creating certain internal 
tensions within the enlarged set of principles.90 For example, the limitations
of self-regulation in particular (one of the IOSCO Principles), are openly 
critiqued in the 2009 Unregulated Markets study as “typically voluntary
and the standards lack regulatory status and consistent implementation.  
Moreover, neither the industry initiatives nor market discipline averted 
the deficiencies that contributed to the global financial crisis.”91  Such  
candour is refreshing and bodes well for a more critical look at international 
standards. 
But the IOSCO Principles, old and new, remain at the heart of the
FSAP exercise, which brings us back to contagion and predictability.
The FSF and the FSAPs did not address contagion issues.  Neither did they
predict the global financial crisis.  They were asking the wrong questions, 
looking in the wrong directions, and, blinded by the glare of international
standards, failed to appreciate the complexity and diversity of financial 
markets and the problems posed by their regulation. 
88. In May 2008, the Technical Committee of IOSCO had already published a report 
on the matter. See  TECHNICAL COMM., IOSCO, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE 
SUBPRIME CRISIS (2008), available at http://www.iasplus.com/iosco/0805ioscosubprime 
report.pdf. 
89. The full range of current IOSCO initiatives may be consulted on the IOSCO home 
page. IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2011). 
90. See TECHNICAL COMM., IOSCO., UNREGULATED FINANCIAL MARKETS AND 
PRODUCTS 3 (2009), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf 
(“. . . all systemically important financial markets and instruments should be subject to 
an appropriate degree of regulation and oversight, consistently applied and proportionate 
to their local and global significance.”).  The report acknowledges both the existence of the 
unregulated markets, and their importance particularly to international markets; in fact,
that unregulated markets are at the origins of the international capital markets as well as
the complexity of the issues involved. See id.
91. Id. at 5. 
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IV. CONCLUSION
In April 2009, the Group of Twenty (G-20) announced the creation of 
a successor institution to the FSF, the new Financial Stability Board 
(FSB), to be housed at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
headquarters in Basle, Switzerland.  The immediate question is the extent to
which the FSB can overcome the legacy of the FSF.
On the face of it, the FSB is attempting to address certain criticisms
directed towards the FSF. Certainly it has made an effort to be visible in
the public eye.  Membership has been expanded to a larger number of
countries so as to include China and Indonesia, two of the three holdouts
in the “systemically important” category of financial economies. The 
private club will no longer be quite so exclusive, or reclusive.  There is a 
specific mandate to promote financial stability, but there is nothing new 
there. What is new, however, is that members have agreed to a planned 
“peer review” of their financial systems, overcoming the drawbacks to
the voluntary FSAP process, at least with respect to members of the FSB.
The FSAP process, according to Mario Draghi in his April 2009 
speech announcing the creation of the FSB, would continue apace.92  A
few months later, in September 2009, the IMF and the World Bank, 
jointly,93 published a ten-year review of the FSAP process, featuring 
some “key” new approaches.94  In addition, “Early Warning Exercises”
are to be conducted together with the IMF, which was announced at the 
FSB inaugural meeting in June 2009.95  “Procyclicality” is now the
92. Mario Draghi, Chairman, Fin. Stability Forum, Re-establishment of the FSF as
the Financial Stability Board, Remarks at the London Summit of the Financial Stability
Board (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/ 
r_090402.pdf. The IMF and The World Bank Boards published their latest review of the
FSAP in September 2009. See MONETARY FUND & WORLD BANK, supra note 62. The IMF 
and the World Bank, in reviewing the FSAP process, decided that in order to facilitate the
integration of the stability assessment done in the context of FSAPs into IMF surveillance and
the World Bank’s financial sector work, a key innovation introduced by this review was 
the option to conduct FSAP updates in smaller, more flexible modules, focused on either
stability or development aspects. See MONETARY FUND & WORLD BANK, supra note 62, 
at 22.
93. A joint publication is in itself an indication of greater cooperation and
communication between the IMF and The World Bank. 
94. See MONETARY FUND & WORLD BANK, supra note 62. 
95. In addition to the joint early warning exercises (EWEs) proposed by the FSB, the 
IMF is developing its own EWEs for large complex financial institutions (LCFI).
Significantly, the “methodology builds on and will supplement current LCFI monitoring 
and analysis that is conducted through bottom up analysis of balance sheets” (emphasis 
in the original). See Thematic Review on Compensation, infra note 99, at 33. 
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watchword of the day, that is, acting with a view to a “system wide
approach to financial stability and embed a macroprudential orientation
to regulatory and supervisory frameworks.”96  The goal is to induce a
“race to the top” in the “implementation of international supervisory and
regulatory standards.”97  To do so, the FSB has announced a “name and
shame” program to publish the names of “non-cooperative jurisdictions” 
at the end of 2010.98 
How the new FSB will differ from the FSF is unclear at this point.  It
is yet early, but the FSB still appears to be working at the margins.  Its 
first review under the new FSB Framework for Strengthening Adherence 
to International Standards was completed in March 2010, a Thematic
Review on Compensation.99  To consider the trivial political football of 
executive compensation as a priority in supporting financial stability in 
the midst of a global financial crisis is a bit like the band playing on as 
the Titanic sinks. 
It is likely, however, that the FSB must be modest in its own initiatives.
Staffing is limited, with many being relatively short term secondees,
borrowed from other institutions. Its most important role may be to 
serve as a clearinghouse for the initiatives of others.  Certainly a document
which the FSB prepared in June 2010, Ongoing and Recent Work Relevant 
to Sound Financial Systems,100 could be an indication of this role. The
document, over ninety pages in length, is a very useful compilation, with
contact names and responsible authorities, summarizing dozens of diverse 
initiatives ongoing around the world.  The FSB is, in fact, a minor player in 
this work, viewed as a whole together; the IMF and IOSCO feature
prominently as responsible authorities.  The heavy lifting will be left to 
them. 
It would also not be surprising to find a central bank mentality pervading
the institutional culture of the FSB, given its proximity to BIS and the 
background of its leadership. Capital markets and their regulation tend 
not to fall within a central banker’s purview, yet they were the instrument of
 96. FIN. STABILITY BD., REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM ON ADDRESSING
PROCYCLICALITY IN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 8 (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://www.
financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf. 
97. Press Release, Fin. Stability Bd., Financial Stability Board Holds Inaugural 
Meeting in Basel (June 27, 2009), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/
pr_090627.pdf.
98. See Press Release, Fin. Stability Bd., FSB Launches Initiative to Promote Global 
Adherence to International Cooperation and Information Exchange Standards (Mar. 10, 
2010), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/pr_100310.pdf. 
99. See Thematic Review on Compensation, FIN. STABILITY BD. (Mar. 30, 2010),
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100330a.pdf. 
100. See Cover Note by the Secretariat, Fin. Stability Bd., for the FSB Meeting,
Ongoing and Recent Work Relevant to Sound Financial Systems, (June 14, 2010), available 
at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/on_1006.pdf. 
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propagation of systemic risk on a transnational scale, this time round. 
Transmission of systemic risk through the global capital markets is what
has made this crisis different. 
The most notable legacy of the FSF, however, is the policy of the FSB 
to put continued faith in the use of a particular set of international 
standards, with all their demonstrated drawbacks.  However, developments
elsewhere may be producing more nuanced, sophisticated standards, and
fostering a more adept application of them.  The Chairman of the FSB,
in addressing remarks in March 2010 to the Committee on Economic
and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament qualified  the significance 
of international standards by declaring: “ultimately [it is] national and
regional legislatures, accountable to their voters, that must decide and 
implement reforms.”101  Chairman Draghi may have been playing to his
audience (the European Parliament, after all), but at the least is indicating 
awareness of the debates surrounding the undemocratic nature of the
indiscriminate use of international standards.102 
Another hopeful sign of a more nuanced approach to markets and 
standards is the Review of the Differentiated Nature and Scope of Financial 
Regulation—Key Issues and Recommendations103 published in January
2010 by yet another international association of international organizations
—the Joint Forum composed of BIS, IOSCO and IAIS. The Joint 
Forum, unlike the FSB, is an association of regulators—banking, capital
markets and insurance—with real life technical expertise.  They understand
that markets, institutions and regulation, domestic and international, are 
not monolithically the same. 
If there can be any conclusions drawn at this point, it may be not to
have unrealistic expectations of what may be accomplished by the FSB, 
and on the other hand, not to underestimate the nature and degree of
change taking place. 
101. Mario Draghi, Governor of the Bank of It., Chairman of the Fin. Stability Bd., 
Modernisation of the Global Financial Architecture—Global Financial Stability, Remarks 
before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament
(Mar. 17, 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/review/r100318b.pdf. 
102. See Bismuth, supra note 45, 94, 99–102 & 105–08, 110 (discussing the bypassing 
of the democratic process resulting from adoption of international standards). 
103. See generally Review of the Differentiated Nature and Scope of Financial
Regulation, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Basel,
Switz.), Jan. 2010, available at http://www.iaisweb.org/__temp/Review_of_the_Differentiated_
Nature_and_Scope_of_Financial_Regulation_January_2010.pdf. 
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In particular, IOSCO is undergoing a marked transformation, on 
several fronts. Its members are now convinced of the significance of its 
role and prepared to devote more resources.  There is a new operating 
structure being put in place, including a research function.  Although the
resource base of the organization, its national regulators, operate at a 
national level, there is less emphasis being placed on simply aggregating 
national experiences and more on developing a global perspective. 
Rather than focussing on systemic risk in the context of institutions, 
IOSCO will be looking at how international markets disperse risk.104 
The financial industry too seems prepared to welcome an approach 
which is less reliant on top-down, assumption-ridden, one-size-fits-all
international standards. Speaking last year in the Financial Times,105 
Jim O’Neill, chief economist at Goldman Sachs stated: 
When everyone is suffering from what appears to be the same shock, the desire to
implement a co-ordinated response is high, and because of that desire, the ability is
stronger. When everyone is starting to recover, the desire to co-ordinate is inevitably
lessened, and as a result it will be more difficult. Luckily, this is probably a good
thing. . . .G20 members and their leaders have been very wise in the past 12 months. 
The G20 creation itself is a fantastic development.  But let’s not require it always to
have its members do the same thing at the same time.
Hopefully, resilience—bred of diversity—will prove to be a natural antidote 
to financial contagion of the most detrimental sort in the future, and the 
international seismographs finely enough tuned to detect the next
financial earthquake.
104. See IOSCO Media Release, supra note 82. 
105. Jim O’Neill, Op.-Ed., No Need For an Orderly Queue to Exit, FIN. TIMES
(U.K.), Sept. 18, 2009, at 9, available at www.ft.com/cms/s/0/84ab191e-a3d3-11de-
9fed-00144feabdc0.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2011). 
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